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The Relationship Between the Daily and 
Policy-Relevant Liquidity Effects
Daniel L. Thornton
The phrase “liquidity effect” was introduced by Milton Friedman (1969) to describe the first of
three effects on interest rates caused by an exogenous change in the money supply. The lack of
empirical support for the liquidity effect using monthly and quarterly monetary and reserve aggre-
gates data led Hamilton (1997) to suggest that more convincing evidence of the liquidity effect
could be obtained with daily data—the daily liquidity effect. This paper investigates the implica-
tions of the daily liquidity effect for Friedman’s liquidity effect using a more comprehensive model
of the Federal Reserve’s daily operating procedure than has been previously used in the literature.
The evidence indicates that it is no easier to find convincing evidence of a Friedman liquidity effect
using daily data than it has been with lower-frequency monthly and quarterly data. (JEL E40, E52)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2010, 92(1), 73-87.
vincing measure of the liquidity effect” by esti-
mating the response of the federal funds rate to
exogenous reserve supply shocks using daily
data. This is referred to as the “daily liquidity
effect” (DLE). Thornton (2001a) showed that (i)
Hamilton’s estimates of the DLE were the conse-
quence of a few extreme observations and (ii)
there was no evidence of a DLE using Hamilton’s
model and methodology for his sample period
and for sample periods before or after that period.
Recently, however, Carpenter and Demiralp (2006)
report evidence of a DLE using a more complete
model of the operating procedure of the Trading
Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(hereafter, the Desk) than that used by Hamilton.
They also use a reserve supply shock measure
that more adequately reflects reserve supply
shocks that the Desk creates each day in the con-
duct of open market operations.
Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) and Hamilton
(1997) claim that estimates of the DLE provide
T
he phrase “liquidity effect” (LE) was
first used by Milton Friedman (1969)
to describe the first of three effects on
interest rates caused by an exogenous
change in the supply of money.1 Despite its
prominent role in conventional theories of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism, there
has been little evidence of a statistically signifi-
cant or economically meaningful LE.2 Suggesting
that previous attempts to identify the LE have
been unsuccessful because low-frequency data
mix the effects of policy on economic variables
with the effects of economic variables on policy,
Hamilton (1997) sought to develop a “more con-
1 The other two effects are the “income” and “price expectation” or
“inflation expectation” effects (e.g., Friedman, 1969; and Gibson,
1970a,b). These effects have roots in classical economics (e.g.,
Humphrey, 1983a,b). Because of the inflation expectation effect,
an exogenous change in money growth eventually leads to higher,
rather than lower, equilibrium nominal interest rates.
2 The empirical literature on the LE dates back at least to Cagan and
Gandolfi (1969) and Gibson (1970a,b).
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argue that evidence of a DLE need not provide evi-
dence of the existence of Friedman’s LE. Speci  fi  -
cally, I analyze the relationship between the DLE
and Friedman’s policy-relevant LE. The analysis
shows that because of specific features in the Fed’s
operating procedure, its system of reserve require-
ments, and other factors, the relationship between
the DLE and Friedman’s LE is neither simple nor
direct. In particular, statistically significant esti-
mates of the former do not necessarily imply the
existence of the latter. In so doing, I estimate the
DLE using (i) Carpenter and Demiralp’s (2006)
reserve shock measure and (ii) a more complete
model of the Fed’s daily operating procedure than
that used by either Hamilton (1997) or Carpenter
and Demiralp. The empirical evidence indicates
that it is no easier to find convincing evidence of
Friedman’s LE using high-frequency daily data
than it has been using monetary and reserve aggre-
gates at monthly or quarterly frequencies.
The remainder of the paper is divided into
three sections. The upcoming section investigates
the relationship between the DLE and Friedman’s
LE using a detailed model of the Desk’s operat-
ing procedure. Following the literature, in the
next section I develop estimates of an exponen-
tial autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(EGARCH) model of the DLE based on the model.
The empirical model uses Carpenter and
Demiralp’s (2006) reserve supply shock measure.
THE POLICY-RELEVANT AND
DAILY LIQUIDITY EFFECTS
Milton Friedman (1969) termed the first of
three effects of an exogenous change in the supply
of money on nominal interest rates the “liquidity
effect.” Friedman’s LE is relevant for monetary
policy. Consequently, Friedman’s LE is called the
“policy-relevant liquidity effect” (hereafter, LE).
To understand why the DLE need not imply the
existence of the LE, it is important to understand
the mechanism that links the DLE to the LE. In
this regard, it is important to note that the LE stems
from the demand for money; that is,
(1)     
where Mt
d denotes the demand for money, which,
for purposes of illustrating the relationship
between the DLE and LE, is assumed to be a simple
function of a nominal interest rate, i, and nominal
income, yt. Because individuals tend to economize
their holding of money when interest rates rise,
∂f/∂i < 0.
Equilibrium requires that the supply of
money, Mt
s (which, for simplicity, is assumed to
be exogenously controlled by the Fed), equals
demand; that is,
(2)     
The LE is the initial effect of an exogenous change
in the money supply on the interest rates and is
given by
(3)     
where it is assumed that neither nominal income
nor inflation expectations respond immediately
to the Fed’s actions. Friedman (1969) called equa-
tion (3) the “liquidity effect.”
Considerable empirical evidence indicates
that the demand for money is negatively related
to the interest rate and interest inelastic. The inter-
est inelasticity of money demand implies that a
small exogenous change in the supply of money
should cause a relatively large response in inter-
est rates—a relatively large LE. Consequently,
the inability of researchers to find a statistically
significant and economically meaningful LE is
referred to as the “liquidity puzzle.”3
The failure to find the LE using low-frequency
monetary and reserve aggregates has been attrib-
uted to several factors, such as the response of
nominal income or inflation expectations to
money supply shocks and the inability to isolate
exogenous monetary shocks. Researchers have
attempted to overcome these problems using,
among other things, structural vector autoregres-
sions (SVARs). The recursive SVAR, or RSVAR,
has been particularly popular in this literature.
SVAR models have been estimated using a vari-
Mf i y t
d





di dM f i t




74 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
3 See Strongin (1995).ety of monetary and reserve aggregates. Pagan
and Robertson (1995) show that it is difficult to
find convincing evidence of the LE with these
models.4
The inability of researchers to find evidence
of the LE using monthly or quarterly data led
Hamilton (1997) to suggest that the failure of the
RSVAR approach likely stemmed from the fact
that changes in Fed policy are frequently due to
information about “current or future values of out-
put, inflation, exchanges rates, or other magni-
tudes,” so that “the correlation between such a
‘policy innovation’ and the future level of output
of necessity mixes together the effect of policy
on output with the effect of output forecasts on
policy.”5 He suggested that the LE could be more
easily identified by estimating the response of the
funds rate to reserve supply shocks measured at the
daily frequency. Specifically, he estimated reserve
supply shocks from a simple time-series model of
the Treasury’s daily deposits at the Fed. Assuming
that the errors from this model proxy the reserve
supply shocks that the Desk makes in conducting
daily open market operations, Hamilton (1997)
estimated the response of the federal funds rate
to his estimated reserve supply shocks; that is,
he estimated the DLE. He suggested that his esti-
mates of a DLE implied the existence of the LE.
The Relationship Between the Policy-
Relevant and Daily Liquidity Effects
The relationship between the DLE and the
LE is a result of the Fed’s imposition of reserve
requirements on some components of money.
This creates a direct link between the demand
for money—the source of LE—and the demand
for reserves—the source of the DLE. This relation-
ship can be illustrated by assuming that the
demand for reserves is given by
(4)     
where Rt
d denotes the demand for reserves and
RRMt
d denotes the Federal Reserve–imposed
system of reserve requirements, which depend
on the demand for money. Equation (4) shows
that the demand for reserves is derived from the
demand for money. Hence, in principle, it is possi-
ble to estimate the LE by estimating the response
of interest rates to an exogenous change in the
supply of reserves; that is, by estimating the DLE.
The advantage of using daily data is that measures
of reserve supply shocks at this frequency cannot
be contaminated by the endogenous behavior of
the Fed as Hamilton (1997) noted. Moreover,
since the response will be identical whether the
shock to reserves is due to an error the Desk makes
in conducting daily open market operations or is
a monetary policy–induced exogenous shock to
reserves, there is no identification problem as
there is when higher-frequency monetary and
reserve aggregates are used. It is sufficient to
identify a reserve supply shock from any source.
The strength of this relationship, however,
depends both on the Desk’s daily operating pro-
cedure, which has remained essentially the same
since at least the early 1970s, and the Fed’s system
of reserve requirements, which has not.
The Desk’s Operating Procedure. The analysis
begins with a model of the Desk’s operating pro-
cedure. Each day the Desk estimates the quantity
of reserves that banks will demand over a main-
tenance period ending every other Wednesday,
called “settlement Wednesday.”6 The Desk also
estimates the quantity of reserves that will be
supplied if the Desk conducts no open market
RR R M t
d
t
d = ( ),
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4 The exception is using a RSVAR with nonborrowed reserves as the
monetary aggregate. Coleman, Gilles, and Labadie (1996) pointed
out, however, that evidence of an LE using nonborrowed reserves
may be a consequence of the Desk’s efforts to offset the effect of
changes in discount window borrowing. Thornton (2001b) con-
firmed this by showing that the estimated LE using nonborrowed
reserves is a consequence of the interest sensitivity of discount
window borrowing and the Desk’s operating procedure under
either monetary aggregate or funds rate targeting. He shows that
this “liquidity effect” using nonborrowed reserves vanishes in the
early 1980s when borrowing declined dramatically and became
relatively interest-insensitive.
5 Hamilton (1997), p. 80.
6 Until October 1979 the estimate of demand was conditional on the
objective or target for the federal funds rate. From October 1979
to September 1982, the estimate was conditional on the objective
for the growth rate of the M1 monetary aggregate. Beginning in
September 1982, the Fed claimed that the estimate was conditional
on an objective for borrowed reserves; however, Thornton (2006)
provides evidence from Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
transcripts suggesting that the real objective was the federal funds
rate. Today the objective is unquestionably the federal funds rate.operations that day.7 If the former estimate
exceeds the latter, the operating procedure sug-
gests that the Desk add reserves through an open
market purchase. If the former is smaller than
the latter, the procedure suggests that reserves
be drained through an open market sale.
Specifically, the Desk estimates the demand
for total reserves:
(5)     
where TRt
d denotes the demand for total reserves,
ERt
d denotes depository institutions’ demand for
excess reserves, and Et–1 denotes the expectation
operator conditional on information available
before that day’s open market operation.
The supply of reserves available each day is
given by 
(6)     
where Bt denotes the Fed’s holding of government
debt before that day’s open market operation, BRt
denotes bank borrowing at the discount window,
Ft denotes autonomous factors that affect reserve
supply—currency in circulation, the Treasury’s
balance at the Fed, the float, and so on—and OMOt
denotes the amount of open market purchases or
sales conducted by the Desk that day.8
Each day the Desk estimates the supply of
reserves that will be available if the Desk conducts
no open market operations: OMOt = 0. The Desk
essentially knows the magnitude of Bt, but it must
estimate Ft. The Desk does not estimate borrow-
ing, but rather applies the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC)–determined borrowing
assumption, called the initial borrowing assump-
tion (IBAt).9 The estimate of reserve supply if the
Desk conducts no open market operations is
ET R ER R f i y EE R tt
d
tt t t t
d
−− − = () () + 11 1 ,,
T R BB RFO M O t
s
tt t t =+ ++ ,
(7)     
where Et–1Ft denotes the Desk’s estimate of auton  -
omous factors. The amount of the open market
operations suggested by the Desk’s operating pro-
cedure, which I call the operating procedure–
determined open market operation (ODOMOt),
is given by
(8)     
If OPDOMOt is positive, the procedure directs
the Desk to purchase securities; if it is negative,
the procedure indicates that securities should be
sold.
If the Desk follows its operating procedure
exactly, OMOt = OPDOMOt. The operating proce-
dure is intended only to provide the Desk guid-
ance, however. Judgment is used to conduct each
day’s open market operation. Indeed, over most
of the period examined here, the Desk almost
never followed the operating procedure exactly
(e.g., Thornton, 2007). To allow for this fact, let
(9)     
where kt denotes the amount by which actual open
market operation differs from that recommended
by the operating procedure.
Reserve market equilibrium requires that the
demand for reserves equals the supply; that is,
(10)   
Substituting equations (8) and (9) into equation
(10) yields
(11)
The interest rate that equates the reserve market
is the federal funds rate, fft. Thornton (2006) shows
that the FOMC has been targeting the funds rate
to some extent since 1982.10 Consequently, the
ET R B EF I B A tt
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7 A more detailed analysis of the Desk’s operating procedure can be
found in Feinman (1993) and Thornton (2001b, 2007).
8 Borrowing (and later the initial borrowing assumption) refers to
seasonal plus adjustment borrowing. Extended credit borrowing
is treated separately as one of the autonomous factors affecting
reserve supply.
9 The initial borrowing assumption was changed relatively infre-
quently and, most often, when the funds rate target was changed.
Thornton (2006) shows that the initial borrowing assumption was
last mentioned in discussing monetary policy during a conference
call on January 9, 1991. However, it remained part of the Desk’s
formal operating procedure until at least 1996.
Thornton
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10 See Thornton (1988, 2006) for the relevant evidence.Desk’s expectation of reserve demand is condi-
tional on the FOMC’s target for the funds rate.11
Consequently, equation (11) can be rewritten as
(12)
If the reserve supply shock is given by Ft – Et–1Ft,
the DLE is given by 
(13)   
where RR′ > 0. Equation (13) shows that the rela-
tionship between the DLE and the LE depends on
the Fed’s system of reserve requirements, RR..
The Role of Reserve Requirements
Several aspects of the Fed’s system of reserve
requirements affect the relationship between the
DLE and the LE. Important among these is the fact
that reserve requirements are not imposed on all
components of money. For example, there are no
reserve requirements on the currency, and the
percentage reserve requirements are different for
various components of money.
Also, reserve requirements have changed
over time, both exogenously and endogenously.
The Fed made two major exogenous reductions
in reserve requirements during the past two
decades—in December 1990 and April 1992.12
In addition, an important endogenous reduction
in effective reserve requirements began in 1994
when banks started “sweeping” their retail trans-
actions deposit accounts to reduce their effective
percentage reserve requirement (e.g., Anderson
R Rfiy R RE ff f y E R E E R tt t t t t
d
tt
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and Rasche, 2001). The result was a significant
reduction in effective reserve requirements and
a significant rise in the number of “nonbound”
banks—banks that satisfy their reserve require-
ments with vault cash.13 This change has impor-
tant consequences for the relationship between
the DLE and the LE in that it severs the contem-
poraneous link between money demand and
reserve demand for nonbound banks.
Importantly, the Fed reintroduced lagged
reserve accounting in July 1998. Beginning with
the maintenance period that began on July 30,
1998, there is a full two–maintenance-period
(four-week) lag in the reserve accounting system.
Reserve requirements for the current maintenance
period now are determined by deposit balances
held during the 14-day period two maintenance
periods before the current one. This system of
lagged reserve accounting severs the contempora-
neous link between money demand and reserve
demand for all banks, not simply nonbound banks.
Hence, there is no contemporaneous relationship
between the DLE and the LE after July 1998.
Con  sequently, statistically significant estimates
of the DLE after this date (e.g., Carpenter and
Demiralp, 2006; and Judson and Klee, 2009) pro-
vide no evidence of the LE. The statistically sig-
nificant negative relationship between the funds
rate and reserve supply shocks merely reflects the
fact that banks have an incentive to economize
on their holdings of non-interest-bearing reserves.
This incentive exists even if the demand for
money does not depend on the interest rate,
because reserve demand is interest sensitive for
reasons other than the interest sensitivity of the
demand for money.
Finally, Thornton (2001a) has noted a two-day
lag in the Fed’s prior reserve accounting system
from March 1984 to July 1998.14 Specifically, a
bank’s maintenance-period reserve requirement
was based on deposit balances held two days
before the end of the maintenance period. The
lack of a contemporaneous relationship between
Thornton
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11 For a more detailed explanation, see Thornton (2001b).
12 Effective December 13, 1990, the 3 percent reserve requirement on
non-transaction liabilities was reduced to 1.5 percent for weekly
reporters; effective December 27, 1990, the 1.5 percent reserve
requirement on non-transaction liabilities was reduced to zero for
weekly reporters. The combined effect of these actions reduced
required reserves by an estimated $13.2 billion. Although not
reported here, these changes appear to have had no important effect
on the estimates of the DLE reported in the next text section. There
have been numerous other changes in the Fed’s percentage reserve
requirements over the years; however, these were relatively small
and of little consequence.
13 See Anderson and Rasche (2001) for more details on the effects of
retail sweep programs.
14 From 1968 to March 1984 there was a one–maintenance-period
lag in the Fed’s system of reserve accounting.money demand and reserve demand on those
days means that evidence of a DLE on the last two
days of the maintenance period need not imply
anything about the existence of the LE.
Analyses by Clouse and Dow (2002) and
Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002), however, show
that reserve demand may be related to money
demand on the last two days of the maintenance
period if individual banks behave optimally with
respect to the reserve carryover provision.15 These
models do not include the costs of operating such
procedures, however, and these costs could be
large relative to the cost of satisfying a reserve
shortfall at the end of the maintenance period
through the discount window or in the federal
funds market.16 Consequently, it is not clear
whether such intense reserve management—
though technically feasible—is economically
viable.17 In any event, even if banks behave opti-
mally, the relationship between the DLE and the
LE would be affected by the fact that reserve
demand on these days is due to the carryover
provision. Consequently, the extent to which
estimates of the response of the funds rate to a
reserve supply shock on the last two days of the
maintenance period provide evidence of the LE
is uncertain.
ESTIMATING THE DAILY 
LIQUIDITY EFFECT
Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp
(2006) estimate the DLE using a model based on
a simpler version of equation (12). Estimating the
DLE requires several additional assumptions.
First, it requires an assumption about the Fed’s
system of reserve requirements. Effectively,
Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp
(2006) assume that the Fed’s system of reserve
requirements applies to all components of the
money supply; for example, 
(14)   
where rr denotes a proportionate reserve require-
ment, say 0.10. This assumption is crude because
(i) reserve requirements do not apply equally to
all components of the money supply, (ii) rr may
differ for various components of alternative defi-
nitions of money, (iii) rr has changed over time
both exogenously and endogenously, and (iv) rr
is effectively zero with the introduction of lagged
reserve accounting in 1998 and during the last
two days of the maintenance period before the
adoption of lagged reserve accounting. Despite
these problems, to maintain comparability with
the previous literature, equation (14) is assumed.
Second, following Hamilton (1997) we assume
that money demand is a linear function of the
federal funds rate; that is,
(15)   
where α and β are positive fixed parameters and
ηt denotes an i.i.d. random disturbance with a
mean of zero and a constant variance.18 With these
assumptions, equation (12) can be rewritten as
(16)
where ~ denotes the Desk’s estimate of the corre-
sponding parameter or variable.
Thornton (2001a) has shown that estimates
of the DLE can give misleading indications about
the LE on days with large idiosyncratic shocks to
the funds rate. In particular, the distortion can
be large on settlement Wednesdays. Hence, spe-
cial care is taken in estimating the DLE on days
with large idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.
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15 I thank Jim Hamilton for pointing out this possibility to me.
16 For example, the one-day cost of paying a 1 percentage point pre-
mium on a $100 million dollar reserve shortfall is $2,739.73.
17 There is also no direct evidence that banks actually implement
such procedures. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from reserve account
managers of two very large New York banks in the late 1990s sug-
gests that these banks did not rely on such procedures to manage
their reserves.
Thornton
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18 Equation (15) assumes that the funds rate is a reasonable proxy
for the interest rate in the money demand function. However, this
need not be the case. The literature on monetary demand has
debated whether a long-term or short-term rate should be in the
money demand function and, if it is a short-term rate, which short-
term rate it should be.Finally, Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and
Demiralp (2006) note that a necessary condition
for obtaining unbiased estimates of the DLE is
that reserve supply shocks be uncorrelated with
shocks to money demand, ηt. However, equation
(16) shows that the measure of reserve supply
shocks that they use (i.e, a measure of Ft – Et–1Ft)
must also be uncorrelated with BRt – IBAt, kt,
ERt
d – Et–1ERt




included in Hamilton’s (1997) or Carpenter and
Demiralp’s (2006) models.
Following the literature the DLE is estimated
using an EGARCH model based on equation (16).
The EGARCH model is in the class of autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) models
developed by Engle (1982) and was introduced
by Nelson (1991). The specification takes the
general form
(17)   
where Xt denotes a 1-by-l vector of l regressors
and β denotes the corresponding l-by-1 vector of
coefficients. The errors, εt, are assumed to be
conditionally heteroskedastic. Specifically,
(18)
where Zt is a 1-by-m vector of observable variables
that determine the evolution of the variance and
δ is a corresponding m-by-1 vector of coefficients.
The coefficient ψ allows for the possibility of
asymmetry in the response of shocks to the funds
rate. Because ARCH models account for hetero  -
skedasticity, they produce estimates of β that
are generally more efficient than ordinary least
squares.19
Figure 1 presents fft and fft
* over the period
January 2, 1986, through January 20, 2004. It
shows a number of volatility clusters typical of
ARCH. Some of these are associated with well-
defined events, such as the marked increases in
ff X t T ttt =+ =… βε ,, , , , 12























volatility associated with the 1987 stock market
crash (bracketed by the first two vertical lines)
and the surprise reduction in reserve require-
ments in 1990 (bracketed by the third and fourth
vertical lines). There is also a marked decline in
volatility that appears to begin in early 2000
(denoted by the fifth vertical line), which may be
associated with changes in the FOMC’s disclosure
procedures. Moreover, it shows a relatively large
number of volatility spikes—days when the funds
rate changed by a relatively large amount only to
return to essentially its previous-day’s level the
next day. These spikes are often unique to the
funds rate. Some are associated with well-known
events (e.g., settlement Wednesday and the first
and last days of the year or quarter); others are not.
Hamilton (1996) found that a number of
dummy variables were useful in modeling the
behavior of the federal funds rate. Following
Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp
(2006), dummy variables are included for (i)
each of the 10 maintenance-period days (Di, 
i = 1,2,…,10); (ii) the first and last days of the
month, quarter, and year (bom, eom, boq, eoq, eoy);
(iii) the 15th day of the month (mom); (iv) the day
before and after holidays (bh and dh, respectively);
(v) the day before and after changes in the funds
rate target (btar and atar, respectively); (vi) the
month of December (dec); and (vii) the first and
second week of the maintenance period (w1, w2).20
Dummy variables are also included for the period
of the 1987 stock market crash (d1987) and the
surprise change in reserve requirements (d1990).21
The error made by the staff of the Board of
Governors each day in forecasting Ft is the reserve
supply shock and is denoted miss.22 Separate
Thornton
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19 However, because the EGARCH specification is not an integral part
of the model, the basic equation was also estimated with ordinary
least squares to determine whether the qualitative conclusions are
affected by using the EGARCH model. The results indicated that the
qualitative conclusions are robust to the use of the EGARCH model.
20 If the 15th falls on a weekend or a holiday, mom takes on the
value of 1 on the business day closest to the middle of the month.
21 d1987 takes on the value of 1 from the first day of the stock market
crash, October 19, 1987, through December 31, 1987, and zero else-
where. d1990 is 1.0 from the first settlement Wednesday affected
by the changes, December 13, 1990, through February 28, 1991,
and zero elsewhere.
22 The Board staff’s estimate is a proxy because, in reality, the staffs
of the Board and the New York Fed make independent estimates
of the autonomous factors. The Treasury makes an independent
estimate of one of the factors, namely, its balance at the Fed. Exactly
how these estimates are combined each day in conducting open mar-
ket operations is unclear. See Thornton (2004) for further details.estimates of the demands for required and excess
reserves are made by the staffs of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of
Governors; however, the Board’s estimates are
used here.
Because of the introduction of sweep account-
ing in January 1994, initially the model is esti-
mated over sample period January 2, 1986, though
December 31, 1993. Carpenter and Demiralp
(2006) found the DLE to be nonlinear and statisti-
cally significant for large shocks (shocks > $1
billion) but not for small shocks (shocks  $1
billion). Hence, for some specifications, miss is
partitioned into large shocks (misst
lg) and small
shocks (misst
sm) using their criterion. Because of
the two-day lag in the Fed’s system of reserve
requirements during this period, settlement days
are partitioned into the last two days of the main-
tenance period (l2d) and all other days (nl2d).23
Also, because the effect of reserve supply shocks
on the funds rate differs on days when the funds
rate target is changed, dummy variables for days
when the target was changed (dΔfft
*) and other
days (dnΔfft
*) are included. Finally, the Student
t-distribution, rather that the normal distribution,
is used to account for the thick tails in the distri-
bution of the funds rate.
The results in Table 1 are for three specifica-
tions, which differ by the variables included in
the model. The coefficient estimates are presented
in three sections. Table 1A reports the estimates
of β for the parameters that are relevant for eval-
uating the DLE and the LE. Table 1B reports esti-
mates of coefficients on the dummy variables that
are included to account for various characteristics
of the data. Table 1C reports the estimates of the
variance parameters (equation 18) and the rele-
vant summary statistics.
23 Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) partition miss by each day of the
maintenance period. However, save the last two days of the main-
tenance period, there is no particular reason to believe that the slope
of the money demand curve should be systematically distinct on
different days of the maintenance period. Consequently, this is
not done here.
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The Effective Federal Funds Rate and the FOMC’s Funds Rate Target 
(January 2, 1986–January 20, 2004)Consistent with the model given by equation
(16), the dependent variable is fft and not fft – fft
*,
as in Carpenter and Demiralp (2006), or Δfft, as
in Hamilton (1997). Note that fft – fft
* would be
the appropriate dependent variable if and only if
the Desk correctly estimated the interest elasticity
of money demand—that is, β
~
= β.24
Specification 1 most closely resembles
Carpenter and Demiralp’s (2006) model. Specifi  -
cally, misst is partitioned into large and small
misses using their criteria, and the response of
the funds rate is allowed to differ depending on
whether (i) the target changed that day, (ii) the
miss occurred on the last two days of the mainte-
nance period, or (iii) it occurred on one of the
other eight days. The estimates of the variance
parameters for this specification presented in
Table 1C show that the variance increased signif-
icantly during the periods immediately following
the 1987 stock market crash and the 1990 surprise
reduction in reserve requirements. Also, consis-
tent with the thick-tailed distributions, character-
istic of interest rates, the estimate of the degrees
of freedom (dof) parameter is small, 3.77, and
statistically significant, indicating the appropriate-
ness of using the Student t-distribution.
All but a few of the estimates of the coefficients
on the various dummy variables presented in
Table 1B are statistically significant. Not surpris-
ingly, in most cases, the estimated responses are
as one would expect: The funds rate tends to be
higher on settlement Wednesdays, higher at the
end of the quarter, the first and last days of the
month, and so on.
Table 1A reports the estimates relevant for
the DLE and the LE. As expected, reserve supply
shocks that occur on days when the FOMC
Thornton
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24 The federal funds rate is very persistent and, hence, close to a unit
root process. Hamilton’s dependent variable is the change in the
funds rate, while Carpenter and Demiralp’s is the spread between
the funds rate and the funds rate, both of which are stationary. The
funds rate is used here because it is consistent with the model given
by equation (16). However, to make sure that the qualitative con-
clusions reported here are not due solely to the near nonstationarity
of the funds rate, the specifications reported in Table 1 were also
estimated imposing the restriction β
~
= β. While the numerical
values of the parameter estimates change, the important qualita-
tive conclusions were the same.
Table 1A
Estimates of the Reserve Market Model (January 2, 1986–December 31, 1993)
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
fft
* 0.5555 0.0000 0.5523 0.0000 0.5580 0.0000
Δfft
* 0.0003 0.3820 0.0004 0.3238 0.0004 0.3320
misst
sm × dΔfft
* 0.0104 0.5593 0.0109 0.1679 0.0106 0.1763
misst
sm × dnΔfft
* × l2d –0.0047 0.8203
misst
sm × dnΔfft
* × nl2d –0.0083 0.0219
misst × dnΔfft
* × l2d –0.0327 0.0000
misst × dnΔfft
* × nl2d –0.0109 0.0000
misst × dnΔfft
* × l2d × O –0.2181 0.0000
misst × dnΔfft
* × l2d × NO –0.0275 0.0001
misst × dnΔfft
* × nl2d × O –0.1195 0.0049
misst × dnΔfft






* × l2d –0.0323 0.0000
misst
lg × dnΔfft
* × nl2d –0.0114 0.0000
BRt – IBAt 0.0243 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000
errt
D 0.0088 0.0000 0.0089 0.0000 0.0088 0.0000
kt –0.0048 0.0003 –0.0046 0.0005 –0.0047 0.0004changed the funds rate target are not statistically
significant, regardless of whether the shocks are
large or small. Also, consistent with Carpenter
and Demiralp (2006), the response of the funds
rate to small shocks on all but the last two days
of the maintenance period is statistically signifi-
cant and smaller than the response to large shocks.
However, the magnitude of the difference between
the response to large and small shocks is relatively
small. Indeed, the likelihood ratio test statistic for
equality of the response is 0.464, which is not
statistically significant at any reasonable signifi-
cance level. Contrary to Carpenter and Demiralp’s
(2006) results, there is no evidence of nonlinearity.
Given the absence of nonlinearity, the model
is estimated without partitioning the reserve
supply shocks into large and small shocks. Esti  -
mates of this specification are presented as speci-
fication 2 of Table 1. Again, there is no statistically
significant response of the funds rate to reserve
supply shocks that occur on days when the target
is changed. Also, consistent with Hamilton (1997)
and Thornton (2001a), the response of the funds
rate on the last two days of the maintenance period
is about three times larger than the response on the
other eight days, and it is statistically significant.
As expected, the coefficients on BRt – IBAt,
kt, and errt
D are all statistically significant. The
coefficient on BRt – IBAt is positive, suggesting
that borrowing above the FOMC’s assumed level
is associated with the funds rate above the target.
The sign of the coefficient is inconsistent with a
supply shock interpretation, but it is consistent
with the evidence that borrowing responds
endogenously to the funds rate (e.g., Thornton,
2001b). The coefficients on kt and errt
D have the
Thornton
82 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
Table 1B
Estimates of the Reserve Market Model (January 2, 1986–December 31, 1993)
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
fft–1 × w1 0.4472 0.0000 0.4504 0.0000 0.4447 0.0000
fft–1 × w2 0.4461 0.0000 0.4494 0.0000 0.4436 0.0000
D1 –0.0132 0.2335 –0.0126 0.2555 –0.0130 0.2425
D2 –0.0556 0.0000 –0.0691 0.0000 –0.0683 0.0000
D3 0.0468 0.0000 0.0340 0.0001 0.0342 0.0001
D4 –0.0287 0.0015 –0.0414 0.0000 –0.0413 0.0000
D5 –0.0351 0.0001 –0.0482 0.0000 –0.0482 0.0000
D6 0.0053 0.6869 –0.0085 0.2980 –0.0077 0.3445
D7 –0.0514 0.0001 –0.0649 0.0000 –0.0640 0.0000
D8 0.0542 0.0006 0.0398 0.0006 0.0403 0.0004
D9 –0.0399 0.0224 –0.0537 0.0001 –0.0524 0.0002
D10 0.0817 0.0000 0.0678 0.0000 0.0690 0.0000
eom 0.0871 0.0000 0.0861 0.0000 0.0881 0.0000
bom 0.0572 0.0000 0.0573 0.0000 0.0570 0.0000
eoq 0.2125 0.0032 0.2159 0.0028 0.2000 0.0035
boq –0.1152 0.0070 –0.1176 0.0056 –0.1202 0.0035
eoy –0.3804 0.0003 –0.3810 0.0003 –0.3675 0.0004
boy 0.4270 0.0006 0.4301 0.0005 0.4351 0.0005
mom 0.0899 0.0000 0.0904 0.0000 0.0903 0.0000
bh –0.0169 0.0329 –0.0163 0.0398 –0.0173 0.0297
ah 0.1097 0.0000 0.1094 0.0000 0.1095 0.0000anticipated signs. The estimated coefficient on kt
suggests that the funds rate tends to be significantly
lower on days when the Desk engages in more
open market operations than the operating pro-
cedure suggests. Likewise, if the Desk underesti-
mates the demand for reserves, the funds rate is
somewhat higher.
Equation (16) suggests that the absolute mag-
nitude of the response of the funds rate to miss,
errt
D, BRt – IBAt, and kt should be equal; however,
this restriction was not imposed.25 Nevertheless,
it is interesting to note that the estimated coeffi-
cients on errt
D and miss on days other than the
last two of the maintenance period are similar in
magnitude but opposite in sign as suggested by
equation (16). The likelihood ratio statistic for
the hypothesis that the responses are equal but
opposite in sign is 0.79.
Thornton (2001a) showed that Hamilton’s
(1997) results were sensitive to days with large
shocks to the funds rate. Hence, I investigate the
sensitivity of the estimates of the DLE to unusually
large and idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.
This is important because the response of the
funds rate to supply shocks on such days is not
necessarily evidence of an LE. Specifically, miss
is partitioned by days with large and idiosyncratic
shocks to the funds rate: outliers (O) and days
with no outliers (NO). Days with idiosyncratic
shocks to the funds rate are obtained by regressing
the federal funds rate on a constant and the 3-
month Treasury bill rate over the sample period.
The residuals from this equation are daily changes
in the funds rate that are not associated with
changes in the 3-month T-bill rate: idiosyncratic
shocks to the federal funds rate. Idiosyncratic
Thornton
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25 Given that borrowing is endogenous, it is unlikely that the restric-
tion would hold for borrowing. Also given that the Desk is free to
deviate from the procedure as it sees fit, it seems unlikely that it
would hold for kt as well. Indeed, a test that the absolute values of
the coefficients on miss, errt
D, and kt are equal is rejected at the 5
percent significance level or lower.
Table 1C
Estimates of the Reserve Market Model (January 2, 1986–December 31, 1993)
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Constant –3.0817 0.0000 –3.0848 0.0000 –3.0208 0.0000
|εt–1/σt–1| 0.7053 0.0000 0.7043 0.0000 0.6821 0.0000
εt–1/σt–1 0.0559 0.2237 0.0585 0.2058 0.0638 0.1507
logσ 2
t–1 0.5387 0.0000 0.5374 0.0000 0.5466 0.0000
D1 + D2 + D3 1.5364 0.0000 1.5356 0.0000 1.5135 0.0000
btar 0.6902 0.0085 0.6768 0.0086 0.6660 0.0097
ah 1.1983 0.0000 1.2091 0.0000 1.1562 0.0000
eom 0.9886 0.0000 –1.8576 0.0096 –1.6951 0.0161
eoq 2.4000 0.0000 2.4184 0.0000 2.3238 0.0000
eoy –1.8168 0.0108 0.9883 0.0000 0.9508 0.0000
mom 0.6470 0.0028 0.6558 0.0024 0.6322 0.0033
d1987 0.4993 0.0239 0.4942 0.0251 1.3252 0.0000
d1990 1.3196 0.0000 1.3238 0.0000 0.5740 0.0099
Degrees of freedom 3.7653 0.0000 3.7529 0.0000 3.7440 0.0000
No. of observations 1,966 1,966 1,966
R
–2 0.9887 0.9885 0.9892
SE 0.2234 0.2244 0.2180
Log likelihood 1477.061 1475.596 1479.130shocks to the funds are considered large when
they are more than 80 basis points (roughly two
standard errors [SEs] of the idiosyncratic shocks
to the funds rate).26 There are 62 days when there
were large, idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate
during the sample period (slightly more than 3
percent of the days), 33 of which occurred on a
settlement Tuesday or Wednesday.
The results are reported in specification 3 of
Table 1. As anticipated, estimates of the DLE are
sensitive to large idiosyncratic shocks to the funds
rate. On days with large idiosyncratic shocks to
the funds rate, the estimated DLE is about 10
times larger than on days without such shocks.
Consistent with the results of Thornton (2001a),
estimates of the DLE appear to be significantly
overestimated on days with large idiosyncratic
shocks to the funds rate. Nevertheless, the esti-
mate on days other than the last two of the main-
tenance period reported in specification 2 is nearly
identical to the estimate when there are no out-
liers in specification 3. Hence, the effect of large,
idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate is reflected
mostly in estimates on settlement Tuesday and
Wednesday.27
Post-1993 Estimates of the Daily
Liquidity Effect
The introduction of sweep accounts in January
1994 dramatically reduced reserve requirements
for banks over time. Anderson and Rasche (2001)
suggest that by the end of 1999, “the willingness of
bank regulators to permit use of deposit-sweeping
software has made statutory reserve requirements
a ‘voluntary constraint’ for most banks” (p. 71).
To investigate the effect of sweep accounts on
the estimate of the DLE, the model is estimated
over the period from January 3, 1994, through
December 31, 1996. To conserve space, only esti-
mates of the parameters that are relevant for the
LE are reported in Table 2. All estimated coeffi-
cients on the various partitions of miss are much
smaller in absolute value than those reported in
Table 1. Moreover, none is statistically significant
at the 5 percent significance level. The estimate
is statistically significant at slightly higher than
the 5 percent significance level when miss is par-
titioned by nl2d and NO. The estimate is only
about half as large as that for the pre-1994 period.
The smaller estimate is inconsistent with the fact
that sweeps effectively reduce reserve require-
ments. Other things the same, lower effective
reserve requirements should have resulted in a
larger coefficient estimate. One possible explana-
tion is that the effective elimination of mandatory
reserve requirements for nonbound banks signifi-
cantly altered the interest sensitivity of reserve
demand independent of money demand. It is
interesting to note that the estimated coefficient
on miss for these days is again equal but opposite
in sign to that of reserve demand shocks.
26 As a robustness check on the qualitative results, values of 40, 50,
and 60 basis points were also used. The qualitative conclusion about
the coefficient miss on NO days is invariant to the value used.
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Table 2
Estimates of the Reserve Market Model











* × l2d × O 0.000 0.820
misst × dnΔfft
* × l2d × NO –0.008 0.881
misst × dnΔfft
* × nl2d × O –0.011 0.281
misst × dnΔfft
* × nl2d × NO –0.004 0.051









27 Given the close relationship between the funds rate and the funds
rate target, the model was also estimated using fft – fft
* as the
dependent variable. While the coefficient estimates changed some-
what, the qualitative conclusions are not sensitive to whether fft
or fft – fft
* is the dependent variable. The quantitative and qualita-
tive results are very sensitive to excluding BRt – IBAt, errt
D, and kt,
however. The correlations between miss and BRt – IBAt, errt
D, and
kt over this sample period are –0.058, 0.352, and –0.013, respectively.Post-1998 Estimates of the Daily
Liquidity Effect
Finally, the model was estimated over the
period August 3, 1998, through January 30, 2004,
to determine whether such evidence has no impli-
cation for the LE. Data on BRt – IBAt, errt
D, and kt
are not available over this period, so the estimates
are likely to be biased. The estimate of the DLE
for days other than the last two of the maintenance
period when there were no outliers is small,
–0.007, but statistically significant. This shows
that the demand for reserves is interest sensitive
apart from the interest sensitivity of the demand
for money. Given the interest sensitivity of reserve
demand, caution is necessary in concluding that
there is a statistically significant and economically
relevant LE based on statistically significant esti-
mates of the DLE.
CONCLUSION
The DLE was first estimated by Hamilton
(1997) in an attempt to find evidence of Friedman’s
(1969) policy-relevant LE, which had escaped
detection using lower-frequency (monthly and
quarterly) data. Unfortunately, Hamilton and sub-
sequent researchers did not investigate the link-
age between the DLE and the LE. This article fills
this gap in the literature by showing that the DLE
is directly linked to the LE by Federal Reserve–
imposed reserve requirements. The relationship
between the DLE and the LE is then analyzed and
investigated using a more comprehensive model
of the Desk’s operating procedure than has been
used in the literature. The analysis shows that
the relationship between the DLE and the LE
depends on the Desk’s operating procedure, the
Fed’s system of reserve requirements, and other
factors. Importantly, the analysis shows that
there is no relationship between these LEs after
July 1998 when the Fed reinstated lagged reserve
accounting.
Estimates of the DLE before 1994 suggest that
there may have been a statistically significant
policy-relevant LE before 1994. The estimated
DLE is small, however. The estimate suggests that
a $10 billion reserve supply shock generates about
a 20-basis-point change in the funds rate. If one
assumes that the average effective reserve require-
ment during the sample period is 10 percent, this
would be equivalent to about a $100 billion shock
to the money supply—much larger than any shock
during this sample period.
More problematic is the finding of a statisti-
cally significant DLE after July 1998, when the
Fed established lagged reserve accounting. The
existence of a DLE over this period is due to the
fact that banks have an incentive to economize
on their holdings of reserves, independent of the
interest sensitivity of money demand. The fact
that there is a statistically significant DLE during
a period when estimates of the DLE can have no
implication for the LE raises a question of the
extent to which estimates of the DLE have impli-
cations for the LE during other periods. It could
be that all estimates of the DLE reflect the interest
sensitivity of reserve demand independent of the
interest sensitivity of money demand. In any
event, the results presented here indicate that it
is no easier to find convincing evidence of a sta-
tistically significant and economically important
policy-relevant LE using high-frequency daily data
than it has been using lower-frequency (monthly
and quarterly) data. A resolution of the liquidity
puzzle remains elusive.
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